Protection of Constitutional Fundamental Rights and Safeguards in Digitalization Age

Abstract

This article examines the impact of digitalization on fundamental rights in criminal procedure through a constitutional and human rights-based perspective. It argues that the growing use of digital tools, data-driven governance, and artificial intelligence in criminal justice does not create a constitutionally exceptional sphere but rather requires the traditional safeguards governing restrictions of fundamental rights to be applied with equal, and in some cases heightened, rigor. In this respect, the study proceeds from the premise that efficiency, speed, and administrative convenience cannot justify a weakening of legality, proportionality, legal certainty, human dignity, or the essence of rights. Instead, digital criminal procedure must be designed and assessed within a framework that preserves due process, effective remedies, equality of arms, and fair trial guarantees. The article first situates digital transformation within broader constitutional debates on the restriction of rights and then develops its analysis through the literature on four possible scenarios concerning fundamental rights in the digital age: the strengthening and expansion of rights through online participation; the emergence of new categories of rights in response to technological risks; the deepening of citizen participation in governance through digital tools; and the intensification of new threats such as surveillance, profiling, data exploitation, and manipulation. These scenarios are used not merely as descriptive categories, but as normative benchmarks for assessing the effects of digitalization on criminal procedure. The article contends that digital technologies may indeed improve access to information, facilitate judicial communication, and strengthen access to justice, yet they may also deepen coercive state power and expose individuals to novel forms of rights interference. Particular attention is devoted to the concept of fourth-generation rights, understood as rights that arise in response to threats posed by technological and scientific developments to human dignity, privacy, and personal autonomy. The study argues that in criminal justice, these rights must be translated into concrete procedural safeguards, especially regarding informational self-determination, digital evidence, algorithmic risk assessments, and technologically amplified investigative powers. In parallel, the article highlights the constitutional relevance of vulnerability and the digital divide. It maintains that digitalization may generate structural inequalities where individuals lacking access, digital literacy, or technological resources are effectively excluded from justice processes. For that reason, the positive obligations of the state extend beyond formal digitization and require inclusive infrastructure, accessibility measures, digital literacy policies, and targeted protections for vulnerable groups. The article further explores online dispute resolution, digital access to justice, and AI-assisted criminal procedure. While digital tools can reduce costs, shorten proceedings, and improve procedural efficiency, these benefits must not come at the expense of criminal procedural guarantees. The use of artificial intelligence in criminal justice therefore demands a framework-based approach grounded in transparency, traceability, human oversight, accountability, and contestability. In this context, the EU AI Act is identified as an important normative model, particularly because it combines outright prohibitions for unacceptable uses with compliance obligations for high-risk systems. The article concludes that the legitimacy and sustainability of digital criminal procedure depend on maintaining a rights-based equilibrium in which technological innovation remains subordinate to constitutional justification, procedural fairness, and the effective protection of human dignity.